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This study examines the determinants of location choices of foreign affiliates by 
manufacturing Japanese firms, using a new data set that matches parents and their affiliates 
created over the years 1995-2003. The analysis is based on new economic geography theory 
and thus focuses on the effect of market and supplier access, as well as production and trade 
costs. Our interest is twofold. First, we investigate the importance of agglomeration and 
spillover effects on the firms’ decision through the use of proxies relating to the presence of 
Japanese affiliates in the host countries as well as to that of Japanese multinational firms at 
home. Overall, our results confirm the economic importance of information sharing and 
network effects both at home and in the host country beside traditional determinants 
pertaining to production and transaction costs and access and supply access. Second, we 
explore whether the effects of key determinants of locational choice vary substantially 
depending on the characteristics of the investing firm and the plant. We find less productive 
and smaller parents to be more likely to create an affiliate in China rather than in Western 
Europe or an OECD country. Moreover less productive firms appear to be more sensitive to 
distance-related costs and low institutional quality while being more responsive to the 
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A buoyant literature has recently emerged on the FDI-productivity nexus (see Greenaway and 
Kneller (2007) and Helpman (2006) for surveys). The causal effect of internationalization on 
Japanese firms’ business performance has been the focus of recent studies (Murakami (2007), 
Inui and Todo (2007) and Hijzen, Inui and Todo (2006)). So far, the empirical evidence is 
somewhat mixed but findings point to the importance of the context. Recent empirical results 
(Sakakibara and Yamawaki (2007), Kiyota et al. (2007) and Ito and Fujao (2006)) suggest 
that the profitability of Foreign Direct Investment is conditional on the parents’ and host 
countries’ features.  
Our study builds on previous literature on the determinants of location choices of foreign 
affiliates by Japanese firms (Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Head et al., 1995; Fukao et al. 2003; 
Kimura and Kiyota, 2006). Our analysis based on the new economic geography theory 
assesses the importance of various determinants of FDI profitability. It focuses on the effect 
of market and supplier access, as well as production and trade costs and explores whether the 
effects of key determinants of locational choice vary substantially depending on the 
characteristics of the investing firm and the plant. 
 
The case of foreign direct investment by Japanese manufacturing firms is interesting since 
internationalization of Japanese firms has expanded greatly since the mid-1980s. Reflecting 
this increase, a large body of literature on Japan’s outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) 
has sprung up which provides interesting benchmark for our results. Moreover, detailed 
datasets have been built to examine the behavior of Japanese multinational enterprises. This 
study relies on a new data set on Japanese firms that matches affiliates and parents during 
1995–2003. We are thus able to determine whether heterogeneous firms respond differently to 
host countries features (such proximity, wages, institutional quality or access to markets) or to 
networks and spillovers. 
Our analysis in closer in spirit to Belderbos and Carree (2002)
1 who investigate the 
determinants of location of Japanese Electronics Investments in China while focusing on 
agglomeration effects and investigating potential heterogeneity in the responses of investors 
                                                            
1 They use a conditional logit model to analyze the influence of regional characteristics on the establishment 
decisions of 229 Japanese plants in the broadly defined electronics industry in 29 Chinese regions and provinces 
during 1990-1995. 3 
 
to locational determinants, depending on the characteristics of the investing firm and the 
plant.  
 
Our motivation is two-fold. First, we expect our results to shed light on the controversial 
productivity-internationalization nexus. It has become something of a stylized fact that ex-
ante productivity determines the choice of whether or not to invest abroad (Greenaway and 
Kneller, 2007). This feature is coherent with Helpman et al. (2004)’s assumption that the 
decision to establish foreign production facilities is based purely on considerations of market 
access. In that context, all FDI is horizontally motivated. However new evidence stresses that 
the productivity distribution between multinationals and non multinationals is not so clear cut. 
Head and Ries (2003) demonstrate that when there are factor price and market size 
differentials, firms invest abroad for vertical motives also and the ordering of the productivity 
distribution between multinationals and non-multinationals can even be reversed. Further 
investigation of the determinants of location choices is thus required. 
Our second motivation relates to the identification of potential informational barriers to 
internationalization of Japanese firms. We investigate whether Japanese parents of different 
productivity and size respond differently to host countries’ features such as distance, 
institutional quality or access to markets and to networks and spillovers. Much evidence 
suggests that Japanese affiliates tend to cluster in the same regions. We consider three forms 
of relatedness. The first two relate to the host location (1) affiliates in the same industry 
originating from the same country (Japan) and (2) downstream affiliates originating from the 
same country. The third form (3) captures proximity at home (in the same Japanese 
prefecture) to parents having affiliates in the same destination country. Clusters of Japanese 
affiliates may form regional production networks, selling intermediate inputs to each other, 
sharing knowledge and thereby lowering production costs. We also investigate whether 
location choices are influenced by the presence of JETRO. 
 
We interpret findings of greater sensibility to distance or institutional quality for less 
productive firms as evidence of greater impediments to internationalization when productivity 
is low. Alternatively, greater responsiveness by low productivity firms to the presence of 
JETRO or strong Japanese community indicates that networks and spillovers may help to 
mitigate those impediments. These features would legitimate policies encouraging 
collaboration between Japanese firms and dissemination of information targeted to small and 
less productive firms. 4 
 
 
Our paper contributes to a better understanding of the determinants of affiliates’ location and 
especially of the importance of agglomeration forces and spillovers. Our empirical estimation 
of firm location choice relies on a model directly derived from the new economic geography 
model (Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al. 1999). Our results are based on a comprehensive data set 
that covers nearly all the affiliates created by Japanese firms across manufacturing sectors in 
54 host countries during the period 1995-2003. Using the information on bilateral trade flows, 
sales of Japanese affiliates by country and the Japanese national input/output table we 
construct measures of market access and supplier access, which we relate to the location 
choice of the affiliates each country and year. We also control for a variety of host country 
characteristics: proxies for trade costs include transportation costs and tariff, and proxies for 
production costs include country specific wage and risks to international business indicators.  
 
Overall, our results confirm the economic importance of information sharing and network 
effects both at home and in the host country beside traditional determinants pertaining to 
production and transaction costs and access and supply access. The effects of key 
determinants of locational choice vary substantially depending on the characteristics of the 
investing firm and the plant. We find less productive and smaller parents to be more likely to 
create an affiliate in China rather than in Western Europe or an OECD country. This result 
suggests that the choice of investing in further away and more competition intensive markets 
is positively correlated with the firm’s productivity. It is rather coherent with recent advances 
of the literature explaining FDI decisions by firm-specific features (Helpman et al. 2004). 
Moreover less productive firms appear to be more sensitive to distance-related costs and low 
institutional quality while being more responsive to the presence of Japanese firms and 
JETRO presence in the host country. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the theoretical 
framework from which the location choice model estimated in the subsequent sections is 
derived, and presents the how access to markets is apprehended. Section 3 describes the data 
and how explanatory variables (as well as the dependent variable) are measured. Section 4 
investigates the extent to which the location of Japanese MNCs affiliates responds to these 
measures and how it depends on the parent’s and affiliate’s specific features. Section 5 
concludes.  5 
 
2-Theoretical framework and empirical implementation 
 
We derive our estimating equation from a new economic geography model (Krugman, 1991; 
Fujita et al. 1999). Our theoretical framework follows that of Mayer et al. (2007), Head and 
Mayer (2004) and Amiti and Javorcik (2007) that describe the expected profits of an affiliate 
in each of the prospective locations and compare them to get insight about the equilibrium 
number of affiliates in each alternative country (Amiti and Javorcik, 2007) or on the 
probability for a firm to invest in a given country (Mayer et al. 2007; Head and Mayer, 2004). 
One of our empirical contributions is to integrate in this framework results by Head and Ries 
(2003) interacting heterogeneity in firm productivity with heterogeneity of potential host 
countries. 
 
The underlying model assumes that firms maximize a profit function subject to uncertainty 
when choosing a location.
2 While the real underlying profit yielded by alternative locations 
cannot be observed, what is observed is the actual choice of each firm and the characteristics 
of the alternative locations.
3 
 
The theoretical framework underlying the empirical analysis is a reduced version of a 
standard New Economic Geography model of monopolistic competition based on Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977), similar to that used by Fujita et al. (1999) and Redding and Venables (2004).  
We consider a world with R  locations, composed of firms operating under increasing returns 
to scale and producing differentiated manufactured products. Consumers’ utility increases 
with the number of varieties. The demand for differentiated products is modeled in the usual 
symmetric constant elasticity of substitution way, with σ  (σ   > 1) being the elasticity of 
substitution between any pair of products.  
                                                            
2 The deterministic component of the profit function consists of the various attributes of locations that can 
influence the profitability of building a plant in a particular location. The random component consists of 
maximization errors, unobserved characteristics of choices or measurement errors. 
3 As emphasized by Mayer and Mucchielli (1998), the economic decision studied in theoretical location models 
is by nature a discrete choice among several alternatives made by individual firms. Turning to empirical matters, 
the econometric model should therefore ideally have these features too. For this reason, models with a qualitative 
endogenous variable and particularly conditional logit models have been widely used in the preceding empirical 
work on industrial location. 6 
 
The final demand for goods in location  j  (destination) is derived from the maximization of 
the representative consumer’s CES utility function.
4 Country  j ’s demand for a variety 











− =  (1) 
where  j E  is location  j ’s total expenditure on manufactured goods and  rj p  is the price of 
varieties from location r  sold in  j  (consisting of the mill price  r p  and iceberg transportation 












= ∑ , with  r n  being the number of firms in r .  
Taking into account that  rj T  units must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive, we obtain 
the effective demand  rj x  faced by a firm in r  from location  j :  
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σσ σ σσ −− − −− ==  (2) 
As demonstrated by Redding and Venables (2004), the own price elasticity of demand is σ , 
and the term 
1
jj GE
σ −  shows the position of the demand curve faced by each firm in market  j . 
This latter is referred to as the “market capacity” of country  j . It corresponds to local 
expenditure  j E  adjusted for the “market crowding” effect  j G , which summarizes the number 
of competing firms and the prices they charge. Intuitively, a greater number of competitors 
and thus a lower value of  j G  will reduce the attractiveness of  j  for any firm exporting there.  
Equation (2) underlines that trade costs influence demand more when the elasticity of 




− =  as the “phi-ness” of 
trade (see Baldwin et al., 2003). This can take a value between 0 (when trade costs are 





4 See Fujita et al. (1999) for a complete statement of the underlying model. 7 
 
2.1-The profit equation for foreign affiliates 
 
Each firm sets its mill rice to maximize profits. Following the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model, 
we obtain the usual marginal revenue equals marginal cost condition, with the resulting mill 
price for each origin r  as a simple mark-up over marginal costs of production,  r c , which is 












All varieties produced in a given region r  are thus valued at the same price (before transport 
costs). The gross profit earned in each market  j  for a variety produced in region r  is given 
by  rj r rj px π σ =/ . 
Substituting in equation (3), summing up the profits earned in each market and substracting 
the fixed costs  r f  necessary to establish a plant in region r, we obtain the aggregate net profit, 
r Π  to be earned in each potential location r :  
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⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ Π= / − = − ∑∑  (4) 
 
Following the literature we write:  
1
rj j j rj j r
jj
GE m M A
σ φφ
− == ∑∑         ( 5 )  
where  r MA  is the “market access” of region r . This is simply the sum of the market 
capacities of all destinations  j ,  j m , weighted by the measure of bilateral trade costs,  rj φ , 
between  r  and  j . This summarizes how well a location is endowed with access to markets 
for the goods it produces.
5  
                                                            
5 As pointed out by Head and Mayer (2006), market access bears a close resemblance to Harris (1954)’s market 
potential. The difference lies in the fact that Harris’ market potential implicitly treats  r G , the price index, as a 
constant and  rj φ  is approximated by 1 rj dist / . In this sense, the  r MA  is real, not nominal, since it incorporates 
the notion that large markets that are extremely well-served by existing firms might offer considerably less 
potential for profits than smaller markets with fewer competitors around them. 8 
 
Let us define the marginal costs of production,  r c , as  , rr i r cw P z
ξζ ψ = , where  r w  is the wage,  , ir P  
is the intermediate input price index in sector i and region r  and z is the price of other factors 
of production (including transaction costs, business impediments and pecuniary externalities). 
 
Taking the natural logs of equation (4) and allowing all variables to be time varying, we have:  
  12 3 , 4 ln ln ln ln ln rr r i r r MAwP z αα α α Π= + + +  (6) 
 
Our theoretical framework thus decomposes the operating profits of affiliates into three main 
components: i) Access to relevant markets in terms of demand, ii) various components of 
production costs among which the price of intermediates and local wages and iii) transaction 
costs and agglomeration effects related to networks. We proxy the price of intermediates by 
supplier access (SA) measures. Theory suggests that a lower input price index has a positive 
effect on profits. The more input varieties available and the lower the cost of accessing those 
varieties are, the lower is the price index and the higher is the profitability. Since individual 
input prices are unavailable, we follow Amiti and Javorcik (2007) and Mayer et al. (2007) to 
construct an inverse measure of the price index (described below), by measuring the 
proximity to potential suppliers. We hypothesize that profits are positively related to better 
access to intermediate inputs ( 3 α >0). 
 
In our empirical analysis, we include beside access to market and supply access, wages 
varying by country. The theory predicts a negative coefficient on wages ( 2 α <0), that is other 
things equal, firms prefer to locate in countries that offer lower wages. As in the model, we 
assume that new entrants are too small individually to influence the local wage, so they take it 
as given. The other country specific costs, zr, could include any other factors of production 
whose costs vary between countries. We will consider factors affecting costs upward such as 
transactions costs (proxied by distance to Japan) and impediments to business practices 
(proxied by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index) as well as factors affecting 






2.2-Specification of the location choice model 
 
We estimate the parameters of the profit function (6) using a discrete choice model. As we do 
not observe the potential profitability of each location, we rely upon the assumption that firms 
choose the country yielding the highest profit. The location choice literature makes extensive 
use of the conditional logit model (CLM). This model requires error terms that are 
independent across locations. As it seems likely that the unobserved component of 
profitability is correlated among countries in the same continent, we use a generalization that 
permits such a structure of the random term, the nested logit model (NLM) (Train, 2003). 
This method accounts for the possibility that substitution patterns are not the same across all 
alternatives. To this aim, it partitions the set of alternatives into several “nests” corresponding 
to continents and assumes nest-specific substitution patterns across alternatives. In our 
framework, there are six nests relating to Asia, Western Europe, Rest of Europe, Latin 
America, North America and Oceania. Under this nested tree structure, the location choice 
can be decomposed into two steps, the choice of a nest and the choice of a location inside the 
chosen nest.  
For estimation purposes it is useful to decompose the nested model into two logit functions. 
The profit function can be split into i) a component W that is constant for all alternative 
within a nest and ii) a component Y that varies over alternatives within the nest: 
rr kr YWε Π= + +  with k(=Asia, WEurope, OEurope, LAmerica, NAmerica and Oceania) an 
index designating the nest in which location r  belongs and 
i
r ε  an error which marginal 
distribution is univariate extreme value. This random term can be seen as a shock to the 
marginal cost specific to firm-country pairs. The probability for country r to be chosen as a 
location can be expressed as the product of two probabilities, the probability Pk that an 
alternative with nest k is chosen and the conditional probability  | rk P  for location r  to be 
chosen among the different countries constituting the chosen nest:  | rr k k PP P =  
McFadden (1978) shows that with the specified logistic error structure, each of those 
probabilities can be expressed using the information contained in  k W  and  r Y , with nest-
specific variables used to explain the choice of a nest and location-specific ones explaining 
the conditional probability:  exp( ) kk k k PW Z Z ρ =+ −   where  [ ] ln exp kk k k Z WI V ρ =+ ∑   and  10 
 
1
| exp( ) rk k r k PY Z ρ
− =−  where 
1 ln exp kk r k Z Y ρ
− ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦ ∑  is termed the inclusive value for state k, 
and parameters  k ρ  is the “log-sum coefficient” that reflects the degree of independence 
among the unobserved portions of expected profits for alternative nest k.  
For 0 k ρ = , countries are perfect substitutes between continents whereas for  1 k ρ =  there is 
full independence and patterns of substitution are the same within and between continents. As 
a first step, we constraint both log-sum coefficients to equality and estimate it using the 
variability of  r Y within the nests. As shown by Train (2003), the probability of choosing 
country r is  exp( ) rk r PW Y Z =+ −   and can be estimated by maximum likelihood techniques 
using information entering the profit function. The NLM collapses to the CLM. Then in a 
second step, we adopt a more rigorous approach and consider differences between 
investments depending on the continent of destination in a more structural way. The choice of 
continent is modeled as depending on the continent level of development (average GDP per 
capita), its dynamics (growth rate of GDP over thee 5 years before the investment) and 
average time difference with Japan. We will show that results are only marginally affected 
when estimations rely on the nested logit estimator.  
 
Once a continent is selected, the specific country of location is chosen as to maximize profits. 
In coherence with the theoretical model, key determinants are market and supply access as 
well as agglomeration and spillover effects that mitigate transaction costs. Next section details 
how market access is constructed. In section 3, we describe the data sources and the definition 
of the various other variables in our model.  
 
2.3-Market Access computation 
 
Summing the effective demand  rj x  faced by a firm in r  from location  j  over all products 
produced in r  (equation 2), we obtain the “trade equation” (Redding and Venables, 2004). 
The total value of exports of region r  to region  j  is therefore:   
 
11
rr r j rr r j j j npx np G E
σσ φ
−− =  (7) 
As emphasized by Redding and Venables (2003), this equation for bilateral trade flows 
provides a basis for the estimation of a gravity trade model. While the last term on the right-11 
 
hand side of equation (7) reflects the “market capacity” of region  j , 
1
jj j mG E




σ − , measures what is referred to as the “supply capacity” of the exporting region, 
1
rr r sn p
σ − = . This corresponds to the product of the number of varieties and their price 
competitiveness.
6  
As shown in equation (5), for each country r , market access is defined as 
1
rr j j j j MAG E
σ φ




σ − ) and freeness of trade ( rj φ ), are directly observable, we rely on the two-step 
procedure that was pioneered by Redding and Venables (2004). In this approach, the market 
capacities, m , of international and national trading partners, as well as transport costs, φ , can 
be estimated using a gravity equation.  
Taking natural logarithms in equation (7) yields the basic econometric specification used for 
the trade equation, so the total value of exports to region  j  from all firms based in region r  is 
given by:  
  ln( ) ln ln ln ln r j r r i j rr j jrr j j X npx s m F X F M φ φ == + + = + +  (8) 
The empirical estimation of equation (8) provides us with estimates of the two components of 
market access, freeness of trade and market capacity. Importer fixed effects correspond to the 
log of the unobserved market capacity of the importer region j , 
1 ln ln( ) jj j j FMmG E
σ − == , 
while exporter fixed effects (FXr) capture the log of the exporter’s supply capacity, sr.  
Assuming transport costs,  rj φ , in our gravity equation depend on bilateral distances
7, and a 
series of dummy variables indicating whether the two partners r and j share a common 
language and colonial links, or are contiguous, equation (8) yields the following trade 
regression:  
  
ln ln  common language
 colonial link  contiguity
rj r j rj rj
rj rj rj




                    (9) 
Equation (9) is estimated separately for each year, yielding country specific estimates of 
market capacity and transportation costs to construct country market access. This article 
                                                            
6 Redding and Venables (2003) discuss the concepts of market and supply capacity in greater depth. 
7 In equation 9, distrj denotes the great circle distance between r and j. 12 
 
employs the BACI dataset
8, a cross-country dataset developed in CEPII covering the period 
1995-2003. A detailed description of the original sources and procedures to obtain data is in 
Gaulier et al. (2007). Dyadic information (common language, distance, colonial links and 
contiguity) come from the CEPII Distances database. 
 
3-Data and variables 
 
3.1-The dependent variable: investments abroad 
 
Our dependent variable consists of investments by Japanese firms. Data on Japanese affiliates 
abroad are obtained from the basic survey on Overseas Business Activities conducted 
annually by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).
9  
More than 15,842 Japanese investments in operation in 2001-2003 are listed in our sample 
with corresponding data on when operation started, sector, country of location and other 
details on the nature and the objective of the investment. The initial selection of 6,084 
Japanese investments
10 (initiated over the years 1995-2003) was essentially driven by the 
availability of host country data and the necessity to cover only affiliates providing consistent 
information over time (notably on the sector of operation, date of entry...). Information on the 
affiliates’ parent (such as the location in Japan, size and productivity) is incorporated as the 
affiliates dataset is then merged to the Basic survey of Japanese Business Structure and 
Activity through the Japanese parent identification code. The strength of the survey is its 
sample coverage and the reliability of its information as the survey is compulsory for 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms with more than 50 employees and with capital of 
more than 30 million yen. Its limitation is however that it excludes information on financial 
matters and institutional arrangements such as keiretsu.
11. In coherence with the theoretical 
                                                            
8 BACI aims to provide the international trade database for the largest number of countries (over 200) and years 
(from 1995), with a special care in the treatment of unit values. Original procedures are developed to reconcile 
data reported by countries to United Nations COMTRADE. The data is downloadable from 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci.htm. 
9 We obtain access to the answers for three consecutive years 2001, 2002 and 2003. 
10 They include 1,458 investments in the wholesale and retail sector, 1,281 in other services, 93 in the primary 
sector and 3,252 in the manufacturing sector. 
11 The results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities are prepared annually by the 
Research and Statistics Department, METI (1994-2003). This survey was first conducted in 1991, then again in 
1994, and annually thereafter. The main purpose of the survey is to capture statistically a comprehensive picture 
of Japanese corporate firms that includes their diversification-, globalization-, R&D- and information 
technology-related activities. The survey is compulsory for manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms with 13 
 
model, our empirical estimations will only include affiliates operating in manufacturing 
activities. Because some affiliates do not report their parent identity or due to different 
inconsistency issues (change in the parent identity, unavailability
12 or inconsistency in the 
parent statistics), our final sample covers 3,252 Japanese manufacturing investments of which 
3,124 provide both host country and parent specific information. Since the information on 
parents and affiliates is restricted to the period 2001-2003, our empirical estimations will rely 
throughout on the average features over that period.
13 Our final dataset covers a universe of 
possible location choices to 54 countries. 
 
Further details concerning the data used in the estimations can be found in the data appendix 
(Appendix A) which includes Tables A-1 and A-2 reporting the number of Japanese firms by 
country and manufacturing sectors
14 respectively.  
Map 1 uses this data to plot the accumulated number and total employees of Japanese 
affiliates as of 2003 in the country where they invested between 1995 and 2003. Several 
important features of Japanese investment patterns are immediately apparent: the 
concentration in Asia (especially China), the strong attractiveness of US and UK as well as 









more than 50 employees and with capital of more than 30 million yen (some non-manufacturing sectors such as 
finance, insurance and software services are not included). The sample firms account for about one-third of the 
total national workforce, 99 percent of total exports, and 69 percent of total imports for Japan in 2002 (Kiyota 
and Uruta, 2007). 
12 One rationale for missing parent is that the affiliates survey has no sample restriction in terms of firm size or in 
terms of sectors while the Basic survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activity covers firms above 50 
employees and excludes some non-manufacturing sectors such as finance, insurance and software services. 
13 One would ideally explain the location decision in a year t by information on the parent and on the affiliates 
for that year. Unfortunately, the unavailability forces us to use the average value between 2001 and 2003 and 
implicitly assume that the size of parents and affiliates remain constant throughout time. The explanatory 
variables concerned by this approach are supply access and backward linkages, as they incorporate the sales 
value of affiliates. 
14 The decomposition into sectors follows a 15-sector nomenclature including Textile, Chemical, Basic Metal, 
Fabricated metal products, Industry machinery and equipment, Office, service industry and household 
equipment, Household electric appliances, Electronic data processing machines, Communication equipment, 
Electronic parts and devices, Miscellaneous electrical machinery, Motor vehicles, parts and accessories, 
Miscellaneous transportation equipment, Precision instruments and Other Manufacturing. 14 
 
3.2-The explanatory variables 
3.2.1 Supply Access 
 
The supplier access effect comes through the price indices of intermediate inputs. As explicit 
in the theoretical framework of the NEG, a large number of local suppliers of inputs in a host 
country reduced the price index of intermediate inputs, and therefore production costs, which 
makes the country more attractive (Krugman and Venables, 1995). Since individual input 
prices are unavailable, we follow Amiti and Javorcik (2007) who were the first to 
approximate this effect relying on information on the relative availability of inputs and its use 
by downward sectors. Our measure of supply access is therefore inspired from Amiti and 
Javorcik (2007) but incorporates additional hypotheses as in Mayer et al. (2007) to address the 
unavailability of sector-specific value of output data. First, we assume that an affiliate abroad 
uses intermediate inputs in the same proportion as forms of its industry in Japan, consequently 
the Japanese affiliates’ technical coefficients will be proxied by those from the national 
Japanese IO table. Second, our measure of the relative availability of inputs will only account 
for the location of Japanese affiliates producers of inputs in the host country. Mayer et al. 
(2007) argue that this corresponds restricting to the co-location of these foreign affiliates that 
usually work together and neglecting any belonging of these foreign affiliates to the same 
MNC. This approach implicitly assumes that Japanese affiliates abroad are more likely to buy 
intermediate inputs from other Japanese affiliates or that the location patterns of Japanese 
affiliates abroad are a good representation of the distribution of other firms one can source 
inputs from.  
Our measure of the availability of inputs within a country r that are used by industry i in year t 
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Since industries use more than one intermediate input, these output shares are weighted by 
si a , the technical coefficients from the Japanese national input/output (I/O) table for 2000
15.  
The term  ,
r
s t ψ  stands for the share of the world output of industry s produced (by Japanese 







ψ = , with 
,
W
s t sales , being the overall sales of industry s in country r (by Japanese affiliates present in 
                                                            
15 The Japanese national I/O table has 516 sectors and 108 consolidated sectors, which we concord into the 15 
manufacturing sectors covered in our empirical analysis.  15 
 
year  t). As argued by Amiti and Javorcik (2007), even though individual prices are 
unavailable, the effects should still be well represented since the price index is lower the 
higher the share of intermediate inputs produced in close proximity. This measure is divided 
by the internal distance of country r, Drr, in order to account for the ease of access to suppliers 
inside r. We assume the countries to be circular: as in Leamer (1997), intra national distance 
is modeled as the average distance between producers and consumers in a stylized 
representation of regional geography, which gives  ( ) 2 / 3 rr rr Dd i s t a r e a π == . We lag supplier 
access by one year, in order to limit endogeneity. When controlling for other production costs, 
supply access is a proxy for a low price index of intermediates in the considered country, and 
should therefore enter with a positive sign. 
 
3.2.2 Standard covariates 
 
Our other covariates include the standard determinants of location choice that the theoretical 
and empirical literature have found relevant.  
 
The key measure of final demand, industry-level market access 
1
rr j j j j MAG E
σ φ
− =∑  is 
computed based on the estimation procedure presented in section (2.3). This variable is 
calculated for the year of investment. 
Host country distance from Japan and risks to international business (proxied by the index 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)) are also included in order to capture the 
extent to which it is easier and cheaper for a Japanese investor to operate its business in a 
proximate and business-friendly country. We rely on the composite risk rating for which 0 
denotes the highest risk and 100 the lowest risk. The composite index is based on 22 variables 
in three subcategories of risk: political, financial, and economic. Those components measure 
the level of risk to international business operations present in different countries across the 
globe. They include among others government stability, socio-economic conditions, internal 




16 More information on this data can be found on http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx.  16 
 
Another key proposed explanation for investing abroad relates to production costs. We follow 
the literature and proxy labour costs  r w  by the level of GDP per capita, which is expected to 
enter negatively once demand MAr is controlled for. 
 
Other country/year features relating to agglomeration and spillover effects may have an 
impact on the profitability of an affiliate. Global agglomeration effects relating to the number 
of producers and suppliers ought to be captured by our MA and SA indicators. They will 
account for the effect of positive externalities associated with the proximate location of 
downstream and similar manufacturing activities. Such externalities are associated with 
greater availability and variety in parts and components (Head and Ries, 1996; Belderbos et 
al., 2000).  
We investigate the possibility that agglomeration benefits are stronger when the proximate 
manufacturers are Japanese-owned. There is some empirical evidence that a Japanese firm 
investing in a country where there is already a developed Japanese business “community” 
firms will benefit from lower costs there, everything else equal (Belderbos and Carree, 2002). 
We construct our indicator of Japanese agglomeration intended to account for the Japanese 
presence in a given country at a given period as the total number of affiliates established since 
1990 by Japanese firms. It is computed without including information from the affiliate under 
scrutiny.  
Findings of positive and significant impact of Japanese agglomeration on location choice 
benefits may reflect the fact that prospective investors may share useful information on how 
to operate manufacturing plants in a country with other experienced Japanese firms. 
Belderbos and Carree (2002) argue these greater benefits of clustering can be attributed to 
easier information sharing among Japanese firms through joint membership of industry 
associations, national preferences for amenities such as schools and restaurants, greater 
advantages of proximity due to the use of just-in-time delivery and inventory control systems 
(Reid, 1994), and the use of specialized components and intermediates for which the 
specifications are developed within long-term supplier–assembler relationships in Japan. One 
should note following Mayer et al. (2007) that the count of Japanese firms variable has an 
ambiguous effect in theory. While it may capture positive technological spillovers, 
agglomeration dynamics as well as unobserved attractive features of countries, a high number 
of firms may also mean a high level of local competition for both sales and inputs, which 
reduces attractiveness. We anticipate and actually observe that once controlling for country 17 
 
fixed effects that account for previously omitted factors, the negative competition effect 
become more powerful, and the coefficient on the variable becomes negative as a 
consequence. 
 
We also investigate the economic impact of the presence of a JETRO (Japan External Trade 
Organization) agency in the host country
17. Findings of a positive impact of the presence of a 
JETRO office in the host country on the location choice would suggest positive spillovers 
from JETRO services on Japanese investors. 
Beside those network effects that are identical for all Japanese investors, there might be some 
firm-specific information/transaction costs across countries. In particular, the literature has 
highlighted the economic significance of keiretsu networks (Belderdos and Carree, 2002; 
Head and Ries, 1996; Smith and Florida, 1994; Mayer and Muchielli, 1998; O’Huallachain 
and Reid, 1997; Head et al., 1999; Head and Mayer, 2004; Blonigen et al., 2005). 
Unfortunately we have no specific information on whether our affiliates or parents firms 
belong to the same vertical keiretsu. We nevertheless attempt to account for linkages between 
Japanese firms
18 through two indicators relating respectively to the host and home location.  
First, we anticipate in line with Venables (1996) that vertical linkages can induce clustering of 
suppliers and assemblers in specific locations. It is often argued that numerous suppliers of 
Toyota followed the international steps of their downstream partner.  
Our strategy to compute a measure of Backward linkages adopts the same hypotheses as for 
the Supply Access. It assumes that Japanese affiliates’ technical coefficients can be proxied 
by those from the national Japanese IO table and that Japanese affiliates abroad are more 
likely to sales their output to other Japanese affiliates (or that the location patterns of Japanese 
affiliates abroad are a good representation of the distribution of other firms one can sell 
outputs to). Our measure of backward linkages within a country r that apply to firms in 











17 The list of JETRO offices around the world was taken from http://www.jetro.org/content/97. JETRO provides 
successful market intelligence information and support to Japanese companies looking for successful entry and 
expansion abroad. 
18 Refer to Kiyota et al. (2007) for a study on the determinants of the backward vertical linkages of Japanese 
foreign affiliates focusing on the local backward linkages, or local procurements in the host country. While the 
Market Access indicator should capture demand not only coming from consumers but also from downstream 
firms, findings of statistically significant backward linkages in the regressions suggest additional effects between 
Japanese upstream and downstream firms.  18 
 
where  si b  is the share of output from sector i that is used as an input by sector s taken from the 
Japanese national input/output (I/O) table for 2000 and  ,
r
s t ψ  stands for the share of the world 
output of industry s produced (by Japanese affiliates) in country r, defined as in section 3.2.1.  
Our second strategy to apprehend firm-specific network effects relates to the presence of FDI 
spillovers effects at home in the spirit of what is done in the literature looking at export 
behaviour (Bernard and Jensen (2004). Direct evidence of the positive impact of proximity to 
other exporters is provided by several papers such as Aitken, Hanson and Harrison (1997), 
Greenaway, Sousa and Wakelin (2004), Koenig (2005). Assuming that FDI requires 
specialized knowledge of foreign markets that can be shared through employees exchanges or 
imitation, one would expect the probability of FDI to be greater for firms surrounded by other 
multinationals. We investigate the significance of destination specific FDI spillovers for a 
parent investing in a country by the number of surrounding (defined at the prefecture level
19) 
firms having at least one affiliate in the same host country at the time of entry. The Japanese 
prefecture-level FDI spillovers are computed without including information from the parent of 
the affiliate under scrutiny, as such it is specific to the FDI project under investigation. We 
argue that the FDI spillovers may also help to partially capture spillovers from domestic 
kereitsu agglomeration, since kereitsu network firms tend to agglomerate in Japan and thus 
that knowledge of foreign market might be shared among kereitsu firms.  
We lag our indicators of Japanese agglomeration, backward linkages by one year, in order to 
limit endogeneity problems
20.  
Table A-3 provides summary statistics on our main explanatory variables while Table A-4 
reproduces the matrix of their correlation coefficients. 
                                                            
19 The prefectures of Japan are the country's 47 sub-national jurisdictions: one "metropolis" (都), Tokyo; one 
"circuit" (道), Hokkaidō; two urban prefectures (府), Osaka and Kyoto; and 43 other prefectures (県). A map of 
the Japanese prefectures can be found on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prefectures_of_Japan. 
20 We investigated the importance of host countries’ infrastructure quality based on indicators taken from the 
World Bank (http://econ.worldbank.org) such as the density of roads, railways or phone. Results (available upon 
request) suggest that none of the infrastructure indicators entered in the regression significantly. Since the results 
for the other determinants remained unmodified but the sample size was reduced due to the limited coverage of 




We begin with an investigation of the determinants of the choice of country for locating 
Japanese affiliates relying on the conventional specification used in the literature: the 
conditional (fixed-effect) logit. We then turn to a nested logit specification in which we first 
estimate the choice of country within a given continent and then estimate the choice of 
continent taking into account the attractiveness of its constituent countries. Our first main 
empirical contribution relates to the investigation of importance of agglomeration forces and 
spillovers. Our second contribution corresponds to the analysis of how location determinants 
depend on the investing firm and the plant’s features. 
 
4-1 Benchmark estimations  
 
4-1-a Conditional (fixed effect) logit 
 
The first column of Table 1 reports the results of the very simple model of location choice 
based on distance to Japan, host country GDP and GDP per capita. Column 2 substitutes 
market access to GDP to proxy the demand potential in the destination country while column 
3 further includes the proxies for supply access and backward linkages. Our proxy of risks to 
international business is further introduced in Column 4.  
Colum 5 adds the proxy for Japanese agglomeration, while column 6 further accounts for FDI 
spillovers. The coefficients on both variables are positive and significant, also within the same 
order of magnitude as other findings in the literature. Results highlight the powerful influence 
of Japanese networks both at home and abroad on location choice. Note that introducing these 
two indicators simultaneously affects the point estimates of the other motives (possibly 
common to firms in the networks) downward which is expected (comparing columns 4 and 6) 
though maintaining their respective significance. Column 7, which is our preferred 
specification completes the model with a dummy variable aiming at capturing the potential 
positive impact of JETRO’s services in the host country. The dummy for the presence of 
JETRO in the host country enters with the expected and significant positive sign.  
All of the variables have a very significant impact on location choice, explaining 40% of the 
difference in location choices of Japanese affiliates between countries. Our results confirm 
that profits are negatively related to production and transactions costs. Our proxy for labour 
costs (GDP/capita) and the two transaction costs variables (distance and risks to international 20 
 
business) enter in the expected way, negative for the first two and positive for the latter. 
Results moreover suggest that location choice is positively related to better access to 
intermediate inputs, which are reflected in a lower intermediate input price index, proxied by 
r SA ; and that firms are also concerned about good market access,  r MA . Market access enters 
with the expected sign and its magnitude matches usual findings in the literature. Supply 
access always has a significant and positive effect, which is consistent with results by Amiti 
and Javorcik (2006) and Mayer et al. (2007): Affiliates tend to be located where it is easier to 
find suppliers and outlets. This latter feature is highlighted by the positive and significant 
impact of our proxy of Backward Linkages. Findings of positive and significant coefficients 
on the three indicators introduced in Columns 5 though 7 provide supportive evidence for the 
importance of agglomeration as well as economic spillover effects. With variables taken in 
logs (and a large number of location choices), the coefficient on each variable is very close to 
elasticities of the probability of choosing a country for the average investor (see Train, 2003). 
Estimates in column 7 indicate that a 10% increase in market access and supply access 
increases the probability of attracting Japanese investors by about 2 and 1.3% respectively. 
The impact of backward linkages, agglomeration and spillover effects is quite similar in 
magnitude since a 10% increase in these variables raises the probability of location by 3%. 
The probability of investing in a country with a JETRO office is 28%
21 higher than that for a 
comparable country without JETRO presence. 
In the last two columns, we include country fixed effects in the estimation. This accounts for 
every characteristic of location countries (some observable, some not) that do not vary over 
our time frame, 1995-2003. Distance to Japan and the JETRO variables are naturally dropped 
in that specification, which identifies coefficients in the time dimension only. The proxy for 
business risks loses its significance possibly due to small time variation of institutions over 
the limited period under investigation. We observe an increase in the magnitude of most 
coefficients, with the exception of the spillover indicator. However, this does not change the 
flavor of our results except concerning the impact of the Japanese agglomeration indicator.
22 
As anticipated above, we find that once controlling for country fixed effects that account for 
previously omitted characteristics that make a country a desirable place to invest for Japanese 
                                                            
21 It corresponds to exp(0.25)-1. 
22 As an additional robustness check, we introduced a proxy for the exchange misalignment and/or volatility 
between the potential affiliate’s location and Japan. We relied on the relative change of the country’s exchange 
rate with respect to the yen over the 5 years preceding the affiliate creation. It failed to enter significantly in the 
regressions. 21 
 
investors, the negative competition effect become more powerful, and the coefficient on the 
now purged count of Japanese affiliates becomes negative as a consequence. 
 
Comparing the impact of variables should go beyond comparing elasticities (approximated by 
coefficients here), since our different variables have different variance as displayed in table 
A-3. We follow Head and Mayer (2004) who propose the following thought experiment: Take 
a hypothetical country with mean value of explanatory variables and simulate a one standard 
deviation shock in the variable of interest (market access say). The ratio of new over baseline 
probabilities of being chosen is [1+cv(MA)]
βMA, with βMA being the estimated coefficient in 
our benchmark estimation (Column 7), and cv(MA) the coefficient of variation of the variable 
in question. Carrying this one standard deviation shock exercise gives an increase in the 
“mean country”’s probability of being chosen of 27% for market access, 20% for supply 
access, 63% for backward linkages, 50% for Japanese agglomeration and 48% for spillovers 
at home. 
 
4-1-b Nested logit 
 
We now investigate the problem associated with non-independent errors across nations 
belonging to the same region. The use of the country dummies in specifications 8 and 9 in 
Table 1 should help to mitigate the problem but it does not resolve problems associated with 
cross-industry and inter-temporal differences in the attractiveness of locations. By considering 
the choice of continent for a given choice of country, we condition on all aspects of the 
continent that do not vary across its constituent countries from the perspective of a given 
investor. We consider that the choice of a given region depends on its total size and dynamics 
as well as its remoteness. Those three dimensions are proxied by the average continent 
development level (GDP per capita), average GDP growth over the 5 year period prior 
investment and average time difference with Japan respectively. Results are reported in Table 
2. The five columns of the Table 2 reproduce using the nested logit estimator columns 3 
though 7 of Table 1. The LR test statistics reported in the last line of the Table reject in all 
specifications the null hypothesis of equivalence between nested and conditional logit 
specifications. In most specifications, inclusive values are equal to one for all continents while 
the reverse is true for the other two nests (Asia and in some cases Other Europe). Nevertheless 
signs and magnitude of our coefficients are very similar (compare column 7 of Table 1 and 22 
 
column 5 of Table 2). Overall, our results confirm the economic importance of information 
sharing and network effects both at home and in the host country beside traditional 
determinants pertaining to production and transaction costs and access and supply access.  
4-2 Exploration of location determinants conditionality 
 
One novel contribution of our paper is to explore the possibility that determinants of location 
choice are conditional and more specifically depend on the parent’s and affiliate’ s features. 
We investigate Helpman et al.’s (2004) argument that FDI decisions depend on firm-specific 
features. Preliminary evidence in the case of Japanese firms is provided by Belderbos and 
Carree (2002) who investigate the determinants of location of Japanese Electronics 
Investments in China and the heterogeneity in the responses of investors to locational 
determinants, depending on the characteristics of the investing firm and the plant. We rely on 
a two-fold approach to explore the conditionality of location determinants for our much more 
complete survey of Japanese overseas business activities. 
 
4-2-a Interactive terms between parent’s features and destination 
 
Our first approach is to investigate whether the odds of choosing China, OECD, US or 
Western Europe as a destination depend on the parent’s size (proxied by the number of 
employees) or TFP. We rely on Hijzen et al (2006) estimates of Japanese firm’s Total Factor 
Productivity growth. Their computation follows the method of Good, Nadiri and Sickles 
(1997), taking the year 1994 as the base time period. Results displayed in Table 3 suggest that 
firms choosing to locate their affiliates in China tend to be less productive and of smaller size. 
The picture is exactly opposite as far as location in Western Europe or OECD countries is 
concerned. These results suggest that costs associated with Europe and OECD locations are 
greater, requiring higher TFP and size to afford them. The US market does not seem to 
require higher than average TFP or size. The probability of Japanese firms to investing in 





4-2-b Sample decomposition depending on affiliate’s and parent’s features 
 
Our second approach corresponds to dividing the sample according to the affiliates’ local 
sales ratio and the parent’s size and TFP respectively. These latter two indicators are 
measured similarly to the previous sub-section while the local sales ratio of the affiliates 
correspond to the average share of sales absorbed in the local market as declared by the 
affiliates (over the period 2001-2003). Table 4 displays results based on our benchmark 
specification while splitting the dataset between below and above median for the three 
affiliate’s and parent’s features enounced above.
23 Results are reported successively relying 
on the conditional (fixed effects) and nested logit estimators. While coefficients point 
estimates are slightly different depending on the estimation method, significant differences 
emerge between subsamples that are robust across empirical methodologies. The left hand 
side panel of Table 4 explores heterogeneity between affiliates serving local market with a 
ratio lower or higher than 92% (the median is rather higher than the mean which is 72%). We 
find affiliates with higher local sales ratio to be more sensitive to distance, market access, 
supply access and JETRO presence. Greater responsiveness to these four determinants for 
affiliates focusing in providing appropriate and cheap products to local customers is quite 
logical. Conversely, affiliates with a lower interest in the local market appear to be more 
sensitive to Japanese agglomeration. Possibly their activities are mostly in relation with 
sourcing from or to other Japanese firms and thus not so dependent on local market (demand 
and supply) conditions. 
As far as parent’s characteristics are concerned. Limited heterogeneity is found depending on 
the size, we nevertheless find below median size parents to respond to a greater extent to the 
JETRO presence and to be less sensitive to distance. Turning to TFP cut-off, more productive 
parents appear to be less sensitive to almost all determinants than less productive parents, 
possibly because their above median productivity mitigates the difficulty pertaining to 
distance or outlets constraints. Their location choices seem to valorize to a greater extent 
supply access. These findings may relate to the capacity for productive firms to better exploit 
competition between suppliers. On the opposite, location decisions by less productive parents 
seem to be more sensible to locational advantages such as proximity, market access and 
quality of institutions. Moreover, less productive parents are more responsive to Japanese 
                                                            
23 Very similar findings are obtained using the mean as the criteria to split the sample. They are available upon 
request from the authors. 24 
 
agglomeration as well as the JETRO presence. It is indeed very likely that less productive 
firms rely heavily on information networks (from JETRO office and from other Japanese 
firms in the host country) to reduce costs of entering and operating in foreign countries.  
Overall, our results are quite logical and point to significant heterogeneity in the responses of 
investors to locational determinants, depending on the characteristics of the investing firm and 
the affiliate. Diversity emanates from the parents’ different strengths and weaknesses: greater 
size and TFP appears to mitigate the need for easy outlet (high market access and low 
distance) and thus the sensitivity to networks (Japanese agglomeration) and spillovers 
(JETRO advices). Conversely, high productive parents seem to make the best out of intense 





Our study examines the determinants of location choices of foreign affiliates by Japanese 
firms, using a new data set that matches affiliates and parents during 1995–2003. The analysis 
is based on new economic geography theory thus integrating the effect of market and supplier 
access, as well as production and trade costs. We first investigate beside the traditional 
determinants of location choice, the importance of agglomeration and spillover effects on the 
firms’ decision through the use of proxies relating to the presence of Japanese affiliates in the 
host countries as well as to that of Japanese multinational firms at home. The robustness of 
out empirical work is ensured through the use of both conditional logit and nested logit 
estimations. Our results confirm the economic importance of information sharing and network 
effects both at home and in the host country. 
Our second contribution corresponds to the exploration of variations in the sensitivity to key 
determinants of locational choice depending on the characteristics of the investing firm and 
the plant. We find less productive and smaller parents to be more likely to create an affiliate 
in China rather than in Western Europe or an OECD country. Moreover less productive 
parents appear to be more sensitive to locational advantages such as proximity, market access 
and quality of institutions. Also they seem to value more the information networks provided 
by JETRO presence and other Japanese affiliates abroad. More productive firms on the 25 
 
opposite tend to be more responsive to supply access. As far as differences pertaining to 
affiliates are concerned, our results suggest that affiliates with higher local sales ratio tend to 
be more sensitive to distance and also to factors facilitating the provision of products suited to 
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Table 1: Benchmark results: Conditional (fixed-effects) logit 
  1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Ln Distance to Japan  -0.615*** -1.356*** -0.352*** -0.353*** -0.300*** -0.047  -0.258***     
 (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.069)  (0.072) (0.074) (0.053) (0.077)     
Ln GDP per capita  -0.287*** -1.442*** -0.777***  -0.897*** -0.654*** -0.396*** -0.525*** -0.940*** -0.866*** 
 (0.017)  (0.033)  (0.037)  (0.043)  (0.049) (0.037) (0.053) (0.308) (0.320) 
Ln  GDP  0.838***          
  (0.019)          
Ln  Market  Access    1.329***  0.361*** 0.371*** 0.244***  0.058*  0.200*** 1.215*** 1.006*** 
   (0.031)  (0.041)  (0.043)  (0.044) (0.031) (0.046) (0.136) (0.143) 
Ln Supply Access, t-1      0.434***  0.384***  0.175***  0.219***  0.134**  0.321***  0.327*** 
      (0.050) (0.051) (0.055) (0.048) (0.057) (0.080) (0.082) 
Ln  Backward  Linkages,  t-1      0.441*** 0.440*** 0.317*** 0.308*** 0.308*** 0.281*** 0.285*** 
      (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.043) (0.046) 
Ln ICRG, t-1        1.814***  1.278***  1.225***  0.942***  -0.088  0.221 
        (0.287) (0.284) (0.266) (0.308) (0.430) (0.459) 
Jap. Agglomeration (Ln nb of  Jap. affiliates) t-1          0.406***  0.350***  0.322***    -0.586*** 
         (0.037)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.143) 
Spillover Ln nb of surrounding parents having            0.311***  0.269***    0.185*** 
an affiliate country/year           (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.040) 
JETRO  presence  dummy          0.252**    
          (0.121)    
Continent  dummies  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes  n/a  n/a 
Country-specific dummies  no  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes  yes 
Investment * Country  269 916  269 916  269 916  239 587  239 587  219 964  219 964  239 587  219 964 
Investment  3 252  3 252  3 252  3 143  3 141  2 924  2 924  3 143  2 924 
Pseudo  R2  0.33  0.33  0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.41 





Table 2: Benchmark results: Nested logit 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Ln Distance to Japan  -0.303***  -0.300***  -0.275***  -0.189**  -0.202** 
  (0.071) (0.075) (0.074) (0.080) (0.080) 
Ln GDP per capita  -0.736***  -0.859***  -0.592***  -0.527***  -0.499*** 
  (0.037) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.050) 
Ln  Market  Access  0.304*** 0.323*** 0.171*** 0.146*** 0.153*** 
  (0.043) (0.047) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) 
Ln Supply Access, t-1  0.475***  0.431***  0.235***  0.167***  0.173*** 
  (0.053) (0.055) (0.051) (0.055) (0.055) 
Ln  Backward  Linkages,  t-1  0.444*** 0.437*** 0.297*** 0.304*** 0.291*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) 
Ln ICRG, t-1    1.815***  1.142***  1.329***  1.150*** 
    (0.344) (0.257) (0.224) (0.241) 
Jap. Agglomeration (Ln nb of  Jap. affiliates) t-1      0.409***  0.347***  0.351*** 
      (0.032) (0.042) (0.042) 
Spillover Ln nb of surrounding parents having        0.237***  0.237*** 
an affiliate country/year        (0.053)  (0.053) 
JETRO presence dummy          0.244** 
       (0.120) 
Explanatory variable of choice of Nest (continent)       
Continent GDP per capita  0.067  1.021*  1.826**  0.273*  0.249 
  (0.811) (0.580) (0.749) (0.152) (0.157) 
Continent GDP growth t-5/t   8.457***  8.388***  4.957***  6.220***  6.192*** 
  (1.144) (1.157) (1.292) (1.200) (1.206) 
Average time difference  -0.997  0.104  0.112  -0.768  -0.712 
  (3.099) (1.603) (1.376) (0.520) (0.538) 
Investment * Country  269 916  239 587  239 587  219 964  219 964 
Investment  3 252  3 143  3 143  2 924  2 924 
LR  test  (IV=1)  77.73*** 57.47*** 69.57*** 56.71*** 54.28*** 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 31 
 
Table 3: Investigation of destination parent related specific features (Conditional logit) 




Ln Distance to Japan  -0.361***  -0.015  -0.261***  -0.253***  -0.339***  -0.256*** 
  (0.081) (0.089) (0.078) (0.077) (0.081) (0.081) 
Ln GDP per capita  -0.582***  -0.625***  -0.525***  -0.522***  -0.572***  -0.554*** 
  (0.056) (0.057) (0.054) (0.054) (0.057) (0.050) 
Ln Market Access  0.184***  0.214***  0.197***  0.196***  0.182***  0.172*** 
  (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.043) 
Ln Supply Access, t-1  0.191***  0.179*** 0.136**  0.141** 0.202*** 0.193*** 
  (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.054) 
Ln Backward Linkages, t-1  0.266***  0.285***  0.308***  0.306***  0.265***  0.248*** 
  (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) 
Jap. Agglomeration (Ln nb of    0.388***  0.355***  0.315***  0.313***  0.378***  0.421*** 
Jap. affiliates) t-1  (0.046)  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.046)  (0.045) 
Spillover Ln nb of surrounding   0.298***  0.270***  0.271***  0.279***  0.305***  0.234*** 
parents having an affiliate  (0.039)  (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.044) 
Ln ICRG t-1  1.215***  1.382***  0.987***  0.964***  1.160***  1.603*** 
  (0.319) (0.321) (0.312) (0.310) (0.319) (0.261) 
JETRO presence  0.234*  0.043  0.256**  0.259**  0.238**  0.306*** 
  (0.121) (0.127) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.118) 
China*Ln(parent’s TFP)  -0.647**        -0.303  -0.324 
 (0.291)        (0.315)  (0.325) 
China*Ln(parent’s employment)  -0.045***        -0.045***  -0.029** 
 (0.014)        (0.014)  (0.014) 
OECD*Ln(parent’s      0.908***      
TFP)    (0.287)      
OECD*Ln(parent’s      0.064***      
employment)    (0.014)      
US*Ln(parent’s TFP)      0.489    0.600  0.526 
     (0.373)  (0.403)  (0.343) 
US*Ln(parent’s employment)      0.001    -0.014  -0.006 
     (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.022) 
Western Europe*Ln(parent’s TFP)      1.464***  1.469***  2.055** 
        (0.423) (0.446) (0.879) 
Western Europe*Ln(parent’s         0.179***  0.164***  0.083 
Employment)        (0.042) (0.043) (0.079) 
Fixed effects by continent  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Investment * Country  218 381  218 381  218 381  218 381  218 381  218 381 
Investment  2 903  2 903  2 903  2 903  2 903  2 903 
Pseudo R2  0.40  0.40  0.40  0.40  0.40   
LR test (IV=1)            54.57*** 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4: Results depending on parents and affiliates features: local sales content of affiliates and size and TFP of parent (Conditional & nested 
logit) 
  Affiliates local sale ratio  Parent’s size (number of employees)  Parent’s Total Factor Productivity 





































 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
Ln distance  -0.341***  -0.161  -0.271*** -0.091  -0.282*** -0.201  -0.216**  -0.174 -0.207**  -0.344*** -0.223** -0.283** 
 (0.098)  (0.127)  (0.100)  (0.113)  (0.091) (0.147) (0.095)  (0.162)  (0.104) (0.116) (0.106) (0.112) 
Ln GDP per capita  -0.555***  -0.498*** -0.520*** -0.577*** -0.550*** -0.467*** -0.503*** -0.476*** -0.509*** -0.547*** -0.488** -0.543*** 
 (0.070)  (0.084)  (0.064)  (0.071)  (0.063) (0.102) (0.059)  (0.093)  (0.070) (0.084) (0.072) (0.073) 
Ln Market Access  0.274***  0.098  0.219*** 0.138** 0.207***  0.179**  0.143*** 0.158**  0.144** 0.270***  0.121*  0.243*** 
 (0.060)  (0.070)  (0.056)  (0.059)  (0.054) (0.086) (0.050)  (0.079)  (0.061) (0.070) (0.062) (0.063) 
Ln Supply Access, t-1  0.177**  0.031  0.214*** 0.104 0.103 0.212*  0.142** 0.245** 0.173**  0.074  0.193***  0.183** 
 (0.073)  (0.094)  (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.067) (0.113) (0.065)  (0.110)  (0.076) (0.0887) (0.074)  (0.080) 
Jap. Agglo (Ln nb of Jap. aff.) t-1  0.268***  0.435***  0.261*** 0.531*** 0.330*** 0.273*** 0.365***  0.292***  0.275*** 0.403***  0.330***  0.394*** 
 (0.051)  (0.069)  (0.051)  (0.052)  (0.048) (0.077) (0.052)  (0.074)  (0.052) (0.066) (0.063) (0.057) 
Ln Backward Linkages, t-1  0.308***  0.309***  0.304*** 0.239*** 0.301***  0.333***  0.283***  0.325***  0.334***  0.262***  0.318***  0.240*** 
 (0.040)  (0.053)  (0.041)  (0.046)  (0.036) (0.064) (0.038)  (0.065)  (0.041) (0.050) (0.042) (0.049) 
Spillovers Ln nb of aff created by   0.243***  0.286***  0.262*** 0.111*** 0.282*** 0.262*** 0.260*** 0.203** 0.287*** 0.241*** 0.194*** 0.190*** 
surrounding firms (country/year)  (0.048)  (0.061)  (0.054)  (0.034)  (0.045)  (0.070)  (0.067)  (0.080)  (0.049)  (0.058)  (0.069)  (0.050) 
Ln ICRG t-1  0.925**  1.071**  1.115*** 1.584*** 1.035***  0.886 1.185***  1.165** 0.591 1.461***  0.478  1.458*** 
 (0.394)  (0.501)  (0.307)  (0.318)  (0.360) (0.609) (0.292)  (0.521)  (0.398) (0.496) (0.403) (0.331) 
JETRO presence  0.326**  0.099  0.302**  0.080 0.148  0.573**  0.141  0.556**  0.119  0.419**  0.131  0.407** 
 (0.152)  (0.198)  (0.153)  (0.198)  (0.139) (0.250) (0.139)  (0.250)  (0.164) (0.179) (0.164) (0.178) 
Observations: Investment* Country  136 165  83 799  136165  83799  157 317  61 064  157317  61064  122 7640  95 617  122 7640  95 617 
Investment 1811  1113  1811  1113  2091  812  2091  812  1632  1271  1632  1271 
Pseudo  R2  0.39  0.42    0.40  0.41     0.39  0.41    









1 Textile  124 
2 Other  Manufacturing  553 
3 Chemical  467 
4 Basic  Metal  166 
5 Fabricated  metal  products  100 
6  Industry machinery and equipment  306 
7  Office, service industry and household eqt  32 
8 Household  electric  appliances  61 
9  Electronic data processing machines,  65 
10 Communication  equipment  166 
11  Electronic parts and devices  271 
12 Miscellaneous  electrical  machinery  194 
13  Motor vehicles, parts and accessorise  614 
14  Miscellaneous transportation equipment  32 
15 Precision  instruments  101 




Map 1: Cumulated number of affiliates created between 1995 and 2003 and number 
employees (2002) 34 
 
Table A-2 Explained variable: creation of affiliates by Japanese firms 1995-2003 (by country) 
Country Number  of  projects  Frequency 
Argentina 6  0.18 
Australia 42  1.29 
Austria 1  0.03 
Bangladesh 2  0.06 
Belgium 17  0.52 
Brazil 30  0.92 
Burma 6  0.18 
Canada 22  0.68 
Chile 3  0.09 
China 1,007  30.97 
Colombia 1  0.03 
Czech Republic  18  0.55 
Denmark 1  0.03 
Egypt 4  0.12 
Finland 3  0.09 
France 41  1.26 
Germany 41  1.26 
Greece 1  0.03 
Hong Kong  110  3.38 
Hungary 11  0.34 
India 64  1.97 
Indonesia 194  5.97 
Iran 1  0.03 
Ireland 3  0.09 
Israel 1  0.03 
Italy 15  0.46 
Kenya 1  0.03 
Korea 96  2.95 
Malaysia 112  3.44 
Mexico 36  1.11 
Netherlands 37  1.14 
New Zealand  3  0.09 
Pakistan 5  0.15 
Peru 3  0.09 
Philippines 114  3.51 
Poland 8  0.25 
Portugal 7  0.22 
Romania 1  0.03 
Russian Federation  4  0.12 
Singapore 84  2.58 
Slovakia 3  0.09 
South Africa  13  0.40 
Spain 15  0.46 
Sri Lanka  2  0.06 
Sweden 5  0.15 
Switzerland 5  0.15 
Taiwan 95  2.92 
Thailand 290  8.92 
Tunisia 2  0.06 
Turkey 9  0.28 
United Arab Emirates  1  0.03 
United Kingdom  99  3.04 
United States of America  458  14.08 
Viet Nam  99  3.04 
Total 3,252  100 35 
 
Table A-3: Summary statistics on explanatory variables 
Variables Mean  Standard Error  Minimum  Maximum 
Distance to Japan  9 771  3 951  1 157  18 587 
GDP per capita  8 678  9 849  212  38 509 
Market Access  4.84e+11  1.12e+12  1.63e+09  9.13e+12 
Supply Access, t-1  2.29e-06  6.69e-06  0  0.000071 
Backward  Linkages,  t-1  0.013  0.05 0 0.56 
Jap. Agglomeration (Ln nb of  Jap. affiliates) t-1  79  205  1  2125 
Spillover Ln nb of surrounding parents having an affiliate  2.21  7.14  0  91 
 
Table A-4: Correlation Matrix of explanatory variables 
 Ln  distance






Jap. Agglo (Ln nb 
of Jap. aff.) t-1 
Backward 
linkages 
Ln distance  1           
Ln GDP per capita  0.6058  1         
Ln Market Access  0.2994  0.8061  1       
Ln 1+Supply Access, t-1  -0.3954  0.0543  0.3952  1     
Jap. Agglo (Ln nb of Jap. aff.) t-1  -0.3898  -0.1174  0.2676  0.8557  1   
Backward linkages t-1  0.0333  0.3289  0.5788  0.8034  0.7410  1 
Spillover Ln nb of surrounding parents 
having an affiliate (country/year)  -0.2541  -0.1412  0.0630  0.4535  0.4646  0.3578 
 
 